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Abstract 
Prior research has examined factors that motivate 
executives in general to seek advice from external peers. 
The literature is silent however regarding what IT 
governance mechanisms motivate CIOs to mindfully 
seek advice in their external advice networks. Our 
research shows that simply applying the advice of the 
prior literature in the CIO and IT governance context 
can be counterproductive. We analyze data from a 
survey of 99 municipal corporations to show that an 
effective configuration of IT governance mechanisms 
fits and changes over time with the firm’s financial 
performance and state of IT enactment. The lessons 
learned are instructive for practitioners, while also 
highlighting the importance of attending to context in IT 
governance research. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Firms bring about their own downfall when they 
become preoccupied with internal operations while less 
and less in touch with the external environment [6]. In 
so doing, they develop ‘blindspots’: perceptual filtering 
routines by which they attend to and select information 
that confirms their assumptions while ignoring 
information that disconfirms their assumptions. These 
filtering routines reinforce the existing mindset; they 
reduce ambiguity and provide a perception of 
orderliness that makes organizational life seem more 
predictable and, hence, more manageable. By producing 
a neatly ordered version of reality, they insulate firms 
from the complexities of the external environment. The 
key problem is these filtering routines lead to a lack of 
awareness regarding critical external happenings such 
as threats and opportunities in emerging technologies, 
changing customer demands, and intelligence failures 
[3]. The lack of awareness leads to misalignment 
between IT and the functioning of the organization in 
relation to the organization’s environment [22], which 
can bring about organizational failure [6]. 
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Mitigating this risk requires a heightening of 
sensitivity to external events, such as threats and 
opportunities of emerging technologies. To this end, 
CEOs today are asking their CIOs to play bigger roles 
in the growth agenda by exploring for external advice 
regarding new strategic IT initiatives that can enable 
faster, more agile responses to emerging opportunities 
and threats, as part of IT governance [18]. External 
advice emanates from three sources: peer firms; market 
partners such as customers and suppliers; and, resources 
in the local market such as educated workforces [28]. 
Whereas the latter two sources are market-based, our 
focus is on new insight derived from peer firms in the 
same industry, which is the type of contextualized 
information that has great potential to improve firm 
performance [28].  
By adopting a discerning or ‘mindful’ approach to 
seeking advice regarding strategic IT initiatives from 
peers, CIOs can learn from peers’ successes and avoid 
their mistakes. They can reduce the risks of making a 
poor decision because estimates of the costs and 
potential returns can be made based on the experience 
of prior adopters [12]. They can also economize on costs 
of experimentation and broad market search for 
alternative solutions because these costs are borne by 
first-movers [40]. However, studies show that 
executives are not necessarily motivated to mindfully 
seek external advice from peers [20, 21]. Such less-
mindful external advice seeking leads firms to adopt IT 
initiatives that harm or fail to improve firm performance 
[13]. It is in firms’ interests, therefore, to employ IT 
governance mechanisms that can motivate CIOs to 
mindfully seek advice in their external advice networks.  
The literature is silent, however, regarding IT 
governance mechanisms that motivate mindful search 
for strategic IT initiatives [27]. Thus, the open question 
remains: what IT governance mechanisms motivate 
CIOs to mindfully seek advice in their external advice 
networks? This is our research question.  
To address the research question, we conducted a 
structured survey to test the explanatory power of two 
IT governance mechanisms in motivating CIOs to 
search for IT initiatives and IT-enabled change 
initiatives that could contribute to improve firm 
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performance: (1) executive monitoring, and (2) 
financial incentives. Both mechanisms have been 
theorized to affect executives’ motivations toward 
external advice seeking behaviors [21] but we do not 
know the combined effects in the context of CIOs’ 
search for IT initiatives and IT-enabled change 
initiatives that could contribute to improve firm 
performance. Hence, we follow a prior study [21] of 
contextual factors to examine the effects of (3) prior 
firm financial performance on executives’ advice-
seeking behaviors. We also examine potential 
contingency of the foregoing effects upon (4) firms’ 
state of path dependent learning to use IT strategically 
in daily routines (i.e., IT enactment [4]), which is 
thought to constrain what strategic IT initiatives firms 
are ready and motivated to learn [7]. Findings from our 
study elucidate how different IT governance 
configurations motivate mindful CIO advice seeking 
contingent upon focal-firm context. Implications for 
policymakers and promising avenues for future research 
close the paper. 
 
2. Theoretical foundation  
 
IT governance is an integral part of corporate 
governance, not only because officers’ oversight of IT 
functions can be mandated by legislation [1], but also 
because active board/executive involvement in IT-
related decisions is associated with higher firm 
performance [14]. IT governance consists of two 
dimensions: (1) organizational leadership structures and 
(2) business processes that ensure that the firm’s IT 
supports and extends its strategy and objectives [11]. 
The two dimensions are enabled by two underlying 
functions respectively that we adopt from the IS 
literature: (1) IT governance mechanisms [14] and (2) 
IT enactment [4].  
Firms design and orchestrate IT governance 
mechanisms as a means of rationalizing, directing and 
coordinating the firm’s IT-related decision making [14]. 
Well-designed and orchestrated IT governance 
mechanisms are expected to produce IT-related 
decisions and enactments that are more tightly aligned 
with a firm’s strategic intentions. The IT governance 
team contributes to the value firms derive from IT by 
recognizing pain points, trigger events and other 
symptoms of need for organizational change; by goal 
setting and measurement, in which the impacts of IT on 
firm performance are vigilantly monitored; and by 
promoting change by rewarding managers’ efforts in 
realizing value from enacting IT [7]. IT enactment refers 
to the notion that the features of technology are used by 
actors in their daily actions and routines, which 
contribute to outcomes such as firms’ financial 
performance [4].  
In the context of IT enactment, it is the CIO that is 
responsible for identifying strategic objectives to 
change some aspect of their firm, seek available 
technologies or strategies which may fit their objectives, 
and then provide the ‘go ahead’ for actors within the 
firm to acquire and implement the IT in support of 
achieving the strategic objectives [17]. It is also the CIO 
that possesses both the general lexicon of business 
management and the specialized language and 
knowledge of IS practitioners that facilitates discourse 
on strategic IT initiatives with colleagues at peer firms 
[36]. Hence, it is the CIO that is expected to be the 
foremost boundary spanner that facilitates inflows of 
fresh information with new insights from peer firms that 
can help to improve IT enactment.  
A boundary spanner can be defined as an individual 
employed at a firm who currently has, or previously had, 
direct contact(s) with peers at other firms’ through 
professional associations, meetings, conferences, task 
forces, and so forth [45]. Through these personal 
encounters, boundary spanners form relationships with 
contacts in other firms that provide the conduit for 
inflows of advice from peer firms [28]. CIOs’ boundary 
spanning role is found to significantly affect strategic IT 
initiative performance by importing external knowledge 
and integrating internal knowledge [25]. As boundary 
spanners, CIOs are influenced by peers’ choices of IT 
products or services, and they benchmark the firm’s 
business benefits derived from IT usage against those 
derived by other firms. The external ‘advice network’ is 
constituted when the CIO decides which peer firms to 
turn to for advice [29]. 
Access to peers in CIO’s external advice networks, 
and the perspectives they formed through the experience 
of implementing an IT and strategic IT initiative in their 
own context, can help CIOs to make sound judgments 
about the likely costs and payoffs in their own 
organization, when committing to the strategic IT 
initiative is best to take place, and how implementation 
can best be pursued [37]. Hence, on-going exploration 
in CIOs’ advice networks can help firms to remain 
viable over time by continually renewing the ability to 
adapt; that is, to maintain alignment between IT and the 
functioning of the organization in relation to the 
environment. This ability to adapt is a key factor in 
firms’ financial performance over time.  
The motivation to improve firm performance is 
central to the thesis of mimetic isomorphism, which 
states that firms within an industry come to imitate each 
other in the structures (e.g., technologies) and strategies 
they implement because they learn from each other 
about particular technologies and strategies adopted by 
admired (i.e., higher performing) firms and mimic those 
firms’ IT and strategy choices [23]. In so doing, CIOs 
can improve their own firm’s financial performance, 
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because higher performing firms have knowledge of 
more rewarding opportunities on which the seeker can 
capitalize. Therefore, it is in the best interests of the firm 
to motivate CIOs to on-going advice seeking for more 
rewarding strategic IT initiatives.  
Management theorists contend that executives have 
a natural motivation toward an instrumentality of self-
interest [20]. In this view, executives are motivated to 
seek advice from peers in similar contexts, reasoning 
that their advice is likely to affirm and help defend the 
executives’ current strategic decisions, whereas peers in 
different contexts are more likely to offer alternative and 
disconfirming advice. This reasoning would suggest 
that CIOs are motivated to seek advice from peers at 
firms with similar performance, rather than peers at 
admired, higher performing firms. The problem with 
this advice-seeking behavior is that the CIO foregoes the 
payoffs of learning how to replicate more successful 
strategic IT decisions from higher performing firms, 
how to avoid pitfalls in the course of implementing a 
more rewarding strategic IT initiative, and how to make 
sound judgments about the likely costs and payoffs and 
when committing to the strategic IT initiative is best to 
take place [12]. In short, advice seeking motivated by an 
instrumentality of self-interest can expose the firm to 
agency costs in the form of poor strategic IT decisions. 
This self-interested motivation consequently results in 
advice-seeking behavior that can be labelled ‘less-
mindful’ toward the best interests of the firm [41].  
Notwithstanding the interests of the firm in 
motivating CIOs to mindful advice seeking, the 
literature is silent with regards to IT governance 
mechanisms at firms’ disposal that can motivate CIOs 
to seek external advice for strategic IT initiatives that 
are more rewarding for the firm. To ameliorate this gap, 
we proceed to theorize and empirically assess the causal 
relationships between IT governance mechanisms and 
CIO’s external advice seeking behaviors. The proposed 
theoretical framework, depicted in Figure 1, is explained 
next. 
 
3. Hypotheses development 
 
In the perspective of executive advice network 
generation literature, an executive commences advice 
seeking when encountering a problem or opportunity 
the individual does not have sufficient confidence or 
knowledge to solve alone (e.g., [29]). Particularly when 
the problem or opportunity involves unstructured, 
vague, and complex situations or an uncertain 
environment, executives are motivated to seek external 
peers to help interpret the problem, decompose it, 
identify the relevant and significant problem 
parameters, and possible solutions. And after finding a 
possible solution, executives may contact a peer to 
affirm ideas, confirm judgments, or validate beliefs. 
This perspective does not exhaust all possible sources of 
executives’ motivations for seeking advice in external 
advice networks. However, we believe it identifies firm 
performance as perhaps the most salient contextual 
source of motivations for CIOs seeking to gain 
alignment between information technology (IT) and the 
functioning of the organization to survive in an 
uncertain environment. We will therefore examine firm 
performance as a contextual motivating factor for CIOs. 
But first, we develop hypotheses regarding what IT 
governance mechanisms motivate CIOs to mindfully 
seek advice in their external advice networks. 
 
 
Figure 1. Theoretical framework: IT 
governance mechanisms motivating CIOs to 
mindful external advice seeking 
 
3.1. Mindful external advice seeking (outcome) 
 
Following Fiol and O'Connor [9] we conceptualize 
managers’ mindfulness in terms of perceptual accuracy, 
which can be defined as how accurately managers 
perceive the value of external strategic IT initiatives. In 
our case, perceptual accuracy would refer to the 
congruence between the value CIOs subjectively 
perceive of adopting external advice regarding strategic 
IT initiatives, and the objective value of such initiatives 
in the referent firms. The objective value of strategic IT 
initiatives should be assessed in terms of the relative 
financial performance of the referent firm [38], but 
executives are not necessarily motivated to critically 
evaluate advice by seeking such objective evidence. 
Instead, executives can have a self-interested motivation 
to seek advice from poor performers in an effort to 
defend their prior strategic decisions, which creates 
agency costs for the firm when IT initiatives fail to 
contribute to improved financial performance [21]. 
Therefore, it is in the best interests of the firm to 
motivate CIOs to actively search for advice from 
referents at firms that objectively contributes to higher 
financial performance (i.e., mindful). 
Next, we theorize the antecedents and contextual 
factors that can motivate CIOs to mindful advice 
seeking in the interests of the firm. We address the 
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antecedents in terms of (1) executive monitoring, and 
(2) financial incentives, and we address contextual 
factors in terms of (3) prior firm financial performance 
and (4) focal firm state of IT enactment as follows. 
 
3.2. IT Governance 
 
In order to motivate CIOs to seek out more 
rewarding IT opportunities in the best interests of the 
firm, rather than taking a self-interested defensive 
approach to advice seeking, corporate governance 
researchers advocate for governance mechanisms that 
increase the alignment of executives' personal interests 
with the interests of the firm, key among which is strong 
firm financial performance [21]. Such alignment 
essentially increases the personal consequences to CIOs 
of meeting, or failing to meet, firm financial 
performance targets. Two general mechanisms for 
aligning CIOs’ interests with the firms’ interest in strong 
financial performance are (1) executive monitoring of 
CIOs’ strategic decisions, and (2) financial incentives 
that are contingent upon achieving their firms’ financial 
performance objectives as follows [21]. 
 
3.2.1. Executive monitoring. One of the most common 
corporate governance mechanisms for monitoring and 
oversight of IT is the IT steering committee [14]. The IT 
steering committee consists of senior executives from 
multiple areas of the firm that, collectively, have 
oversight to ensure that strategic IT initiatives are 
attuned to the firm's risk tolerance and strategic 
directions [44]. Executives that vigilantly monitor 
strategic decision-makers do not simply defer to them or 
act as “rubber stamps” for their decisions [21]. Instead, 
they demand justifications and explanations for 
proposed strategic initiatives and constructively 
criticize proposed initiatives when they believe those 
initiatives are ill advised. This would suggest that 
executive monitoring motivates CIOs to validate that 
new advice contributes to relatively higher performance 
in the source firm (i.e., mindful) instead of favoring 
advice from lower performing firms to defend CIOs’ 
prior strategic decisions (i.e., less-mindful). Based on 
the literature we can advance the hypothesis: 
Hypothesis H1. Executive monitoring motivates 
CIOs to mindfully seek external advice from peer firms. 
 
3.2.2. Financial incentives. To the extent that 
executives benefit financially from improvements in 
their firm’s financial performance, they are more willing 
to engage in behaviors that enhance the firm’s financial 
performance [21]. To that end they are motivated to 
make superior strategic decisions, and consequently 
they are motivated to seek out a wide range of opinion 
on strategic issues from peer firms. Because higher 
performing firms know about more rewarding 
opportunities [23], we would expect CIOs motivated by 
an instrumentality of improved firm performance to 
seek advice from higher performing firms (i.e., mindful) 
instead of favoring advice from lower performing firms 
to defend CIOs’ prior strategic decisions (i.e., less-
mindful). Based on the literature, we can advance the 
hypothesis: 
Hypothesis H2. Financial incentives to improve firm 
performance motivate CIOs to mindfully seek external 
advice from peer firms.  
The foregoing section discussed IT governance 
mechanisms to motivate mindful advice-seeking 
behaviors. Next, we discuss contextual factors. 
 
3.3. Focal firm prior financial performance 
 
Extant literature states that poor firm financial 
performance relative to peers is an important source of 
uncertainty that is likely to impel decision makers to 
search for information regarding more rewarding 
opportunities [20]. Low firm financial performance 
signals gaps between strategic IT decisions and the 
firm's performance requirements, which calls into 
question the veracity of the current strategy. To the 
extent that CIOs’ beliefs about strategy are reflected in 
the firm’s current strategy, they feel uncertainty 
regarding their beliefs that informed their strategic 
decisions. This uncertainty evokes psychological 
distress and anxiety, which activates a deep-seated 
motive to restore a sense of certainty. To restore a sense 
of certainty, executives tend to seek external advice 
from executives at other firms in an effort to confirm or 
update their underlying interpretations of the 
environment. When actors regain a sense of certainty, 
they tend to stop searching for advice [5]. This would 
suggest that poor firm performance motivates CIOs to 
seek advice from higher performing firms (i.e., mindful) 
instead of favoring advice from lower performing firms 
to defend CIOs’ prior strategic decisions (i.e., less-
mindful). Based on the literature, we can advance the 
hypothesis: 
Hypothesis H3. Poor firm financial performance 
motivates CIOs to mindfully seek advice from peer 
firms. 
 
3.4. Focal firm state of IT enactment 
 
Organizational change proceeds by combining the 
insights of new information with existing knowledge of 
how to operate, thereby learning to tap the unexplored 
potential of current IT and/or finding ways to exploit 
new IT in practice [28]. The potential for firms to 
understand and act on new information (e.g., new ideas 
of how to enact IT in support of better and more efficient 
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organizational performance) is constrained by firms’ 
absorptive capacities. The premise of absorptive 
capacity states that the potential for a firm to understand 
fresh insights (e.g., regarding the potential of IT) and 
exploit it in practice in a future period (t+1) is a function 
of the accumulated knowledge they can exploit in the 
current period (t). Exploitation is a dynamic capability 
based on routines that allow the firm to refine, extend, 
and leverage existing competencies or to create new 
ones by incorporating new knowledge into its 
operations; that is, firms’ realized absorptive capacities. 
In turn, intensity of effort to exploit knowledge in the 
current period is critical to enhancing firms' potential to 
understand and act on new knowledge in a future period.  
This cumulative path dependent learning process is 
reflected in the literature as characteristically distinct 
states of IT enactment (e.g., [7, 16]), where more 
advanced states are thought to contribute to better and 
more efficient organizational performance [4]. IT 
enactment can be assessed in terms of five states as 
follows [7, 15]. In state 1, Initial, firms know how to 
enact IT in support of business processes that are ad hoc 
and monitored in local departments. They are ready to 
learn how to standardize IT infrastructure. In state 2, 
Repeatable, firms know how to enact a standardized IT 
infrastructure, but business processes remain ad hoc and 
locally monitored. The firm is ready to learn how to 
enact the infrastructure to efficiently coordinate 
business processes across functional departments. In 
state 3, Defined, firms know how to exploit IT 
infrastructure for sharing data to support and monitor 
cooperation between departments, and they are ready to 
learn how to standardize business processes within and 
across departments. In state 4, Managed, firms know 
how to exploit enterprise systems to support and 
monitor standardized end-to-end enterprise processes, 
and they are ready to learn how to extend their enterprise 
systems to exploit new external technologies. In state 5, 
Optimized, firms know how to rapidly connect and 
disconnect new technologies in their supply chains and 
industry to their enterprise systems without damaging 
the integrity of core data and business processes.  
The salient insight of the foregoing ‘states’ view of 
organizational context is that firms in different states of 
technology enactment are likely to have different 
capacities to understand, enact and monitor the 
performance impacts of strategic IT initiatives 
emanating from CIOs’ external advice networks. 
Therefore, we can expect that the combined effects of 
our antecedents – executive monitoring, performance-
based financial incentives, prior firm financial 
performance – on CIO’s motivations towards mindful 
advice seeking will be contingent upon firms’ state of 
IT enactment. Based on the literature, we can advance 
our final hypothesis: 
Hypothesis H4. The configurations of IT governance 
mechanisms that influence CIOs to mindfully seek 
external advice are contingent upon the organization’s 
state of IT enactment. 
 
4. Methodology 
 
We assessed the four stated hypotheses in the 
context of local governments in Canada. These 
organizations are corporations responsible for the 
administration of twelve public services: public 
administration, fire and police services, roadways, 
public transit, drinking water, wastewater, storm water 
management, solid waste management, parks and 
recreation, library services, and land use planning. The 
corporations’ executives have been under tremendous 
pressure to reform traditional business models for public 
service delivery because they need to develop 
innovative ways to address fiscal restraints while 
fulfilling citizen demands for public service [30]. In 
addition, IT governance is a legally mandated element 
of corporate governance in Canada [1]. Thus, local 
governments in Canada provide a potentially rich 
context in which to study mechanisms of IT governance. 
Furthermore, local governments in Canada have a 
common industry association, the Municipal 
Information Systems Association (MISA), which has 
the explicit mandate to provide “a forum for the 
interchange of information between municipal 
representatives, leading to the more efficient use of 
municipal information systems” (misa.on.ca). Thus, 
local governments in Canada provide a potentially rich 
context in which to study CIOs’ external advice 
networking behaviors with peers.  
Data were collected from CIOs by means of a 
structured questionnaire, which consisted of pre-
existing measures from the literature implemented in the 
form of a web-based survey. We obtained a database of 
potential survey respondents from LexisNexis. The 
original database had 505 English-speaking local 
governments across Canada that fit the MISA member 
profile (i.e., minimum $5.2 million in annual revenues). 
Using the MISA member profile assured us that the 
corporations recruited had sufficient scope for strategic 
IT initiatives that could potentially benefit from “the 
interchange of information between municipal 
representatives” (misa.on.ca), while excluding very 
small corporations whose size could bias the analysis 
[39]. 
Recruitment letters were mailed to the CIOs. This 
resulted in 106 CIOs responding as potential advice 
seekers. Data for seven respondents were incomplete 
and therefore dropped from further analysis, and data for 
99 respondents remained. The response rate of 19.6% 
was within the accepted range of prior unsolicited IS 
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surveys that involved CIO respondents (12% to 24.6%, 
[2, 31, 39, 42]). 
We applied fuzzy set qualitative comparative 
analysis (fsQCA; http://www.fsqca.com) to assess 
configurations of causal attributes in qualitative data 
that explain the sample of cases [10, 34]. fsQCA 
identifies configurations in which individual causal 
attributes are consistently present when the desired 
outcome is present, or consistently absent when the 
desired outcome is present, or not associated 
consistently with the desired outcome. fsQCA also 
estimates the coverage of each configuration, which 
refers to the proportion of cases where the outcome can 
be explained by the respective configuration of causal 
attributes. However, it is also desirable to identify 
configurations that appear systematically and not by 
chance. We therefore confirmed that our sample sizes 
for fsQCA meets or exceeds the 15 cases suggested by 
Marx [19]. This threshold is recommended because it 
can identify systematic configurations and reject 
random configurations for our model with five causal 
attributes. 
Results from evaluating descriptive statistics of our 
sample versus the population using ANOVA show that 
the distribution of local governments in each 
province/territory by frequency (t=0.043) and 
percentage (t=1.000) did not differ significantly from 
the population. These results validate the 
representativeness of the sample with respect to the 
population of local governments in the original 
database. The frequency distribution of local 
governments by state of IT enactment showed that too 
few local governments were at state 5 or state 1 to 
include in our analyses. Therefore, our analyses focused 
on the 96% of firms in states 2, 3 or 4 of IT enactment. 
We then combined respondent data with archive data 
from audited annual financial reports for seekers and 
their named sources. The combined dataset represented 
114 unique matched pair source-seeker dyads for 
analysis.  
 
4.1. Measurement operationalization 
 
4.1.1. Advice seeking dyads. We adopted the Cross and 
Sproull [5] instrument to ask respondents to name the 
CIOs/IT directors at up to five peer local governments 
whom they believed were most helpful in providing 
advice (regarding strategic IT initiatives) in the past 
twelve months. Obtaining the names of advice sources 
allowed us to identify matched pair source-seeker 
dyads.  
 
4.1.2. Mindful external advice seeking (outcome). 
Following the perceptual accuracy conceptualization of 
mindful advice-seeking, we next computed the relative 
fit between the perceived helpfulness [5] of source 
firm’s advice as reported by CIOs, and the source firm’s 
actual financial performance relative to the seeker 
firm’s actual financial performance (i.e., the subjective 
versus objective value [38]). For objective measures, we 
adopted three financial ratios that are used in public 
reporting: return on assets (ROA), own source revenues 
(OSR), and financial reserves (RESV). Perceptual 
accuracy was computed as the fit between the perceived 
value and objective value of source’s advice in each 
dyad to obtain an index of mindful advice seeking 
ranging from ‘0.00-poorest fit (lowest perceptual 
accuracy)’ to ‘1.00-best fit (highest perceptual 
accuracy)’.  
 
4.1.3. Prior firm financial performance. The three 
financial ratios (ROA, OSR, RESV) computed for each 
seeker firm were used to assess the effects of seeker 
firms’ prior financial performance on external advice 
seeking behavior, and were compared with the sample 
mean (i.e., higher or lower, H3). 
 
4.1.4. Executive monitoring. We adopted the pre-
existing and validated 3-item instrument for measuring 
board/executive monitoring from Westphal [43], in 
order to measure the extent of executive monitoring by 
the IT steering committee. 
 
4.1.5. Financial incentives. We adopted the pre-
existing validated instrument from a prior study [24] 
that asks respondents to indicate the extent to which the 
firm uses performance-based compensation and the 
extent to which performance-based compensation 
systems are closely linked to improved firm financial 
performance. This instrument is designed to assess 
managers’ motivations to seek advice based on the 
perceived significance of the financial reward and the 
link to financial performance outcomes. 
 
4.1.6. Focal firm state of IT enactment. In order to 
assess firms’ states of IT enactment, we adopted an 
instrument for the government context from Jaklič and 
Štemberger [15] that was based on the industry standard 
COBIT framework [7, 26] and asks CIOs which state 
description best characterizes their organization at 
present: Initial, Repeatable, Defined, Managed, 
Optimized, as defined in section 3.4. CIOs’ responses 
were coded as nominal variables (1-5) to group firms in 
similar states for analysis. 
 
4.2. Reliability and validity of questionnaires 
 
Five experts reviewed the initial structured 
questionnaire. Based on their feedback, we made minor 
changes to the questionnaire to fit the Canadian local 
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government context (e.g., the CIO is typically called an 
‘IT director’). We assessed the corrected inter-item 
correlations and Cronbach’s alpha of the multi-item 
executive monitoring measure to mitigate artifacts in 
our results due to measurement error. The three-item 
measure exhibited good convergent validity and 
reliability (α>0.7) [8].  
 
4.3. Analysis 
 
We computed causal configurations based on 9 truth 
tables: 3 different outcome measures (i.e., mindful 
advice seeking based on ROA, OSR and RESV ratios) 
x 3 sets of firms at states 2, 3 or 4 of IT enactment. Three 
of the nine truth tables were dropped from further 
analysis because insufficient cases met the minimum 
consistency criterion of 0.80 [10, 32]. This left six truth 
tables for further analysis: two truth tables for firms in 
each of the three analyzed states of IT enactment. Based 
on these data, we proceeded to compute the causal 
configurations that explain CIOs’ mindful advice 
seeking.  
We produced two relevant reports for each analysis 
using fsQCA 2.5 [33] in accordance with Ragin and 
Giesel [34]: (1) the core solution, which shows core 
causal attributes that are present in all cases exhibiting 
the outcome (mindful advice seeking), and (2) the 
parsimonious solution, which weighs counterfactual 
cases against supporting cases for each combination and 
then identifies peripheral causal attributes that can have 
an important combined effect on the outcome. In 
accordance with the reporting protocol of prior literature 
(e.g., [10]), the core and peripheral causal attributes that 
emerged from fsQCA are depicted with large and small 
circles respectively in Table 1. A shaded circle () 
denotes a causal attribute that, when present, has a 
causal effect on the outcome, mindful advice seeking. A 
circle crossed out (U) denotes a causal attribute that 
when absent has a causal effect on the outcome. Hence, 
the six columns in Table 1 labelled C1, C2… C6 depict 
six alternative configurations of causal attributes that in 
combination (i.e., logical AND relationships) with each 
other explain the outcome, CIOs’ mindful advice 
seeking, for firms at a given state of IT enactment.  
Redundant configurations of core and peripheral 
causal attributes have been combined for presentation in 
Table 1 in the interest of parsimony [34]. Consequently, 
the coverage for each configuration (i.e., the 
explanatory power of a causal configuration) reported in 
Table 1 is the minimum coverage based on core causal 
attributes only. Coverage estimates the proportion of 
cases where the outcome can be explained by the 
respective configuration of causal attributes. All causal 
configurations reported in Table 1 exceed the minimum 
configuration consistency threshold of 0.75, which 
indicates good explanatory power in configurational 
analysis [32]. 
 
Table 1. Results of configurational analyses 
Firms in: State 2 State 3 State 4 
Causal Configurations: C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 
 
Causal Attributes 
OSR RESV ROA RESV ROA OSR 
Prior 
Financial 
Performance 
  
  
(ROA)   U U   
(OSR)   U U  U 
(Reserves)    U  U 
Executive 
Monitoring 
       
Financial 
Incentives 
   U U   
Coverage: 0.53 0.59 0.29 0.44 0.29 0.82 
Consistency: >0.75 >0.75 >0.75 >0.75 >0.75 >0.75 
 
5. Results 
 
Results from configurational analysis (Table 1) 
address the research question: what IT governance 
mechanisms motivate CIOs to mindfully seek advice in 
their external advice networks? The results show that 
CIOs of firms in state 2 of IT enactment are motivated 
to mindful advice seeking when their firms have high 
efficiency (ROA), independence from grants from 
higher-tier governments (OSR), and cash reserves, 
(RESV) and the effect is enhanced by executive 
monitoring of IT impacts (column C1). The latter two 
conditions, cash reserves and executive monitoring, are 
sufficient to motivate advice seeking from peers with 
high cash reserves (column C2).  
CIOs of firms in state 3 of IT enactment are 
motivated to mindful advice seeking when their firm has 
low operating efficiencies (ROA) and high dependency 
on grants from higher tiers of government (OSR), and 
when executives actively monitor IT impacts on firm 
performance (column C3), as predicted. However, the 
absence of financial incentives linked to efficiency 
motivates mindful advice seeking in state 3 firms, 
contrary to our prediction (Hypothesis H2, which we 
discuss below).  
For CIOs of firms in state 4 of IT enactment, 
financial incentives linked to efficiency provide a strong 
explanation for CIOs’ mindful advice seeking, as 
predicted (column C5). Whereas these results can 
provide guidance for practitioners and policy makers, 
the findings for warrant further discussion of our 
hypotheses as follows. 
 
6. Discussion and Implications 
 
Whereas prior research has examined factors that 
motivate executives in general to seek advice from 
peers, the literature is silent regarding IT governance 
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mechanisms that motivate mindful search for strategic 
IT initiatives. Our findings show that simply applying 
the advice of the prior literature in the CIO and IT 
governance context can be ineffective or 
counterproductive under certain conditions. In the 
discussion that follows, we tease out this context 
sensitivity to identify what IT governance mechanisms 
motivate CIOs to mindfully seek advice in their external 
advice networks in specific contexts. 
 
6.1. State-appropriate IT governance 
 
As per Hypothesis H1, prior literature advocates 
executive monitoring to motivate executives’ mindful 
external advice seeking [21]. We found support for this 
hypothesis in the CIO and IT governance context in five 
but not all six configurations. Configuration C5 shows 
that for firms in State 4 IT enactment, the significance 
of executive monitoring pales in comparison to financial 
incentives in motivating CIOs to seek advice from 
higher efficiency (ROA) peer firms. The results suggest 
that firms should adopt executive monitoring as a 
significant IT governance mechanism for motivating 
CIOs mindful to search mindfully for efficiency-
improving initiatives in States 2 and 3, but the IT 
governance configuration should be changed to 
emphasize financial incentives in State 4. 
As per Hypothesis H2, prior literature advocates 
financial incentives to motivate executives’ mindful 
external advice seeking [21]. In the CIO and IT 
governance context, however, we found financial 
incentives were not causal attributes, or should be 
absent, or were consistent causal attributes, depending 
on a firm’s state of IT enactment as follows.  
In the context of firms in state 2 of IT enactment, 
financial incentives were not consistent causal attributes 
explaining CIOs’ motivations for mindful advice 
seeking. Instead, the sufficient causal attribute was poor 
financial performance (which we discuss later).  
In state 3 of IT enactment, the absence of financial 
incentives explains CIOs’ motivations for mindful 
advice seeking, contrary to the predicted effect. This 
may be explained by research [35] that suggests firms in 
state 3 face the challenge of investing in new integrated 
enterprise systems such as ERP. The implementation of 
ERP incurs high costs that include but are not limited to 
software licenses, maintenance, project management, 
change management, and user training, and the financial 
payoffs can be delayed for years. In this case, tying 
CIOs’ financial incentives to short-term improvements 
in financial results will have the opposite of the intended 
effect: it will ensure that CIOs’ personal interests are 
misaligned and directly conflict with the best interests 
of the firm to make the necessary investments in ERP.  
In state 4 of IT enactment, the presence of financial 
incentives explains CIOs’ motivations for mindful 
advice seeking (as predicted). This may be explained by 
research [35] that suggests firms in state 4 have 
rationalized and replaced with ERP a large number of 
disparate, incompatible, but often interlinked legacy 
systems that impose high costs for updates, support, 
maintenance and license fees for redundant 
functionality. Hence, it is not until state 4 that firms 
begin to reap the efficiency benefits of their investments 
in ERP. For this reason, aligning CIO interests with 
improved operating efficiencies can be an effective IT 
governance mechanism for firms in state 4 of IT 
enactment.  
For practitioners, our findings regarding the 
sensitivity of IT governance mechanisms to state of IT 
enactment (Hypothesis H4) underscore the need for 
executives and policymakers to actively align incentive 
plans with the changing state of the firm and to avoid 
relying on a single approach if the firm is to motivate 
CIOs to actively pursue advice in the best interests of 
the firm. For researchers, confirmation of a moderating 
effect in Hypothesis H4 highlights the importance of 
attending to differences in context when analyzing IT 
governance data from firms in different states of IT 
enactment. 
 
6.2. The interaction of performance and state 
of IT enactment 
 
As previously stated, executive advice network 
generation literature contends that an executive 
commences advice seeking when encountering a 
problem or opportunity the individual does not have 
sufficient confidence or knowledge to solve alone. Prior 
literature adopting this view proposed poor financial 
performance as a poignant example. McDonald et al. 
([21]) specifically examined whether executives facing 
poor performance would seek out friendship peers to 
confirm their views (i.e., less-mindful), or seek out other 
peers to disconfirm false assumptions (i.e., mindful). 
They found both responses which, they explained, could 
mean that some executives become defensive and seek 
validation of their current strategy when they perceive a 
threatening problem, while other executives seek out 
more advice with discretion to inform alternative 
strategies. In the CIO and IT governance context, 
however, our findings support another explanation – the 
interaction of performance and state of IT enactment as 
a contextual factor – as follows. 
Findings for Hypothesis H3 concerning prior firm 
performance exhibited opposing causal effects in firms 
at different states of IT enactment. Specifically, poor 
prior firm financial performance can motivate mindful 
advice seeking (as predicted) in the context of firms in 
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state 3 and 4 of IT enactment. However, CIOs embedded 
in firms in state 2 of IT enactment that engage in mindful 
advice seeking typically have above average prior 
financial performance, contrary to the prediction of 
Hypothesis H3. The latter effect is consistent, however, 
with conjecture in the extant literature when we consider 
the focal firm context. Firms in state 2 lag behind their 
state 3 and 4 peers in implementing ERP. On one hand, 
CIOs of firms in state 2 could feel justified in not 
adopting ERP more quickly and comprehensively when 
firm financial performance is above average. On the 
other hand, firms “performing relatively poorly may be 
preoccupied with their competitive disadvantage. A 
firm in this category, concluding that it has fallen behind 
others in innovating with IT, may come to disparage its 
own competence in this arena. Consequently, in 
contemplating the innovative activities of others, it may 
be more inclined to look for models to slavishly emulate 
than to critically appropriate for local fit” ([37], p. 573).  
For practitioners, this finding suggests that low 
performing firms in state 2 of IT enactment can be 
especially difficult to engage in industry discourse, and 
consequently industry associations and/or (higher tier) 
governments need to adopt different approaches to reach 
and educate these firms. For researchers, this conclusion 
suggests that more research is needed to understand how 
to engage low performing state 2 firms in learning how 
to use IT to improve firm performance from higher 
performing peer firms in their industry.  
In sum, our findings elucidate the significance of IT 
governance in motivating mindful search for more 
rewarding IT initiatives. However, no single IT 
governance approach is most effective in promoting 
mindful external advice seeking in all cases. For 
practitioners, the findings underscore the need to 
strategically update the configuration of IT governance 
mechanisms as the firm matures to different states of IT 
enactment. For researchers, the findings underscore the 
need to attend to focal firm context when examining the 
motivating effects of IT governance configurations. The 
proposed theoretical framework incorporates sensitivity 
to differences in firms’ context and advances a 
foundation for future research on IT governance 
concerning mimesis and diffusion of IT.  
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